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Appellees Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc ("Marriott"). Shari Levitin,
Tom Messina, Brent Ferrin, and Peter Gatch jointly submit this brief. Appellees are
collectively referred to as "Defendants."
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Order Granting Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment entered August 26, 1996, by Judge Pat B. Brian, Third Judicial
District Court Judge, Summit County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3(3)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant Cassedy Stien has raised the following issues for review:
1.

Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "appropriation of name or

likeness" even though she did not appear in the videotape at issue in this case and neither
her name nor likeness were disclosed to the public. Preserved at R. 113-14, 248-50.
2.

Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "public disclosure of

private facts" even though the videotape at issue did not convey actual fact, but was
instead mere opinion, in the form of a joke or spoof. Preserved at R. 113-14, 248-49.
3.

Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "false light" publicity even

though she was not identified nor depicted on the videotape at issue, and even though the
videotape obviously was a joke or spoof. Preserved at R. 113-14; 250-51.
4.

Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "intrusion upon seclusion"

even though the videotape at issue did not convey actual fact and even though there was
no spatial intrusion on Ms. Stien's private life. Preserved at R. 111-12.

242\138044 1
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The factual issues in this case are undisputed. [Appellant's Br. at 3-4].
This Court therefore reviews the trial court's decision under a correction of error standard.
See Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1996).
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of the issues raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This case involves a videotape, depicting various Marriott employees, that
was shown at a Marriott Christmas party. Approximately fifteen people, including Ms.
Stien's husband Brad Bauman, were asked on camera to describe a distasteful household
chore. The audio was then changed to make it appear as if the employees were answering
the question, "What is sex like with your partner?" Mr. Bauman appeared in the video,
but was not identified by name. Ms. Stien did not appear in the video nor was she
identified by name.
Ms. Stien has sued Marriott, and several individuals allegedly responsible
for creating the videotape, for invasion of privacy. Ms. Stien's claims, however, fail as a
matter of law. Ms. Stien does not contend that those who viewed the videotape believed
that the employees were describing what sex was like with their partners, or that her
husband actually was describing his own sex life. Instead, she readily admits that the
videotape was a joke or spoof.

242\138044 1
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
On or about July 17, 1995, Ms. Stien and Mr. Bauman filed a complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah. [R. 1-8]. Mr.
Bauman and Ms. Stien alleged causes of action under the four branches of the tort of
invasion of privacy; appropriation of name or likeness, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and intrusion upon seclusion. Id Mr. Bauman later withdrew voluntarily
from the lawsuit. [R. 331].
On or about April 10, 1996, Ms. Levitin filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of all claims raised in the Complaint. [R. 92-116]. Marriott
joined Ms. Levitin's motion [R. 118-48], and Ms. Stien stipulated that the trial court's
ruling would apply to the remaining Defendants. [R. 257]. Following oral argument, that
included a review of the videotape in question, the Third Judicial District Court granted
the motion and dismissed all claims raised in the Complaint. [R. 331]. The Order
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on August 26,
1996. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum A. [R. 332-37].
The Court found that the videotape did not name Mr. Bauman or Ms.
Stien, nor did it identify either of them by job position, job title, or employment task. [R.
334]. The Court also found that the videotape did not purport to inform viewers of the
participants' actual sexual experiences with their partners, that there was no serious
connotation regarding any of the participants' actual sexual conduct, and, instead, the
video was nothing more than an effort at humor. Id.
Based upon these findings, the Court concluded:

242\138044 1
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1.

No reasonable person could possibly view the videotape as

anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude that the tape was a factual
statement about plaintiffs private life;
2.

Although the videotape may have been in poor taste, it did

not invade Ms. Stien's privacy rights;
3.

The videotape is not reasonably capable of conveying the

offensive meaning or innuendo described by Ms. Stien as the basis for her
invasion of privacy claims;
4.

The videotape did not convey actual fact; it constitutes

mere opinion in the form of a joke or spoof, and thus may not predicate a
claim for false light or invasion of privacy; and
5.

There are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and

the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all
claims for relief.
[R. 334-35].
On September 25, 1996, Ms. Stien filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. 347-49].
C. Statement of Facts.
1.

At all times relevant to this action, Ms. Stien and Mr. Bauman

were husband and wife and Mr. Bauman was employed with Marriott. [R. 8-9].
2.

The videotape in question was displayed at a Christmas party for

Marriott employees and their guests on December 10, 1994. [R. at 36].
3.

In the videotape, Mr. Bauman and the other individuals were asked

to describe a distasteful household chore. [R. at 117, 333].
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4.

The videotape subsequently was edited to make it appear as if

these individuals were answering the question, 4wWhat is sex like with your partner?" Mr.
Bauman's statements on the videotape are as follows:
The smell, the smell, the smell. And then you go with the goggles. You
have to put on the goggles. And then you get the smell through the nose.
And as you get into it things start flying all over the place. And the smell.
And you get covered in these things.

But the smell gets worse and then it gets worse and then it gets worse.

And then your biggest problem is you forget to remove this smell from the
house and then you leave it there and then you come back and your wife
uncovers the smell.

And you have to do it and you have to enjoy doing it. And you can't you
can't get into the idea that this is something that you don't want to do.

But I've found that the goggles work very well because eye protection is a
very important thing.
[R. at 117,33s].1

The cited portions of the videotape constitute the entirety of Mr. Bauman's statements in the videotape.
The ellipses signal portions of the videotape where other participants are speaking. Defendants urge the
Court to view the brief videotape in order to learn its content, context, and tone. Defendants believe that
such a review is necessary to see how the trial court arrived at its decision.
242\138044 1
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5.

The videotape was intended to be a spoof or joke and does not

portray actual facts, events, or interviews. None of the individuals shown on the video
was actually describing their sexual activities or any other private information. [R. at
206, 333].
6.

The videotape is approximately six minutes in length and contains

brief excerpts from over 15 individuals. Mr. Bauman is the second person who appears
on the video, and he appears four more times throughout the video. His name is never
used. [R. 117,333].
7.

Ms. Stien does not appear in the video. She is never mentioned by

name or otherwise identified, either by Mr. Bauman or by any other participant. [R. 117,
334].
8.

The videotape was not used to promote or sponsor Marriott nor

was it instructional in nature. [R. 117, 334].
9.

The videotape did not contain any serious connotation regarding

any of the participants actual sexual conduct. Instead, the videotape was nothing more
than an effort at humor. [R. 117, 334].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly determined that Ms. Stien cannot state a claim for
invasion,of privacy because no reasonable viewer would believe that it conveyed true
facts about Ms. Stien's sex life. The videotape obviously was a spoof on the subject of
"what sex is like" with various, unnamed "partners." Moreover, it is undisputed that
videotape did not depict Ms. Stien, either by name, image, or likeness and the videotape
was not used for commercial purposes. The videotape also did not describe private facts
concerning Ms. Stien or her husband and it was not highly offensive to a reasonable
242\138044 1
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person. Finally, the sexual innuendo allegedly contained in the videotape, carried on in a
public setting, did not amount to an actual intrusion upon Ms. Stien's seclusion.
ARGUMENT
A.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT APPROPRIATE MS. STIEN'S
NAME OR LIKENESS FOR THEIR BENEFIT.

The elements of the appropriation-of-name-or-likeness branch of invasion
of privacy are as follows: (1) appropriation; (2) for one's own use or benefit; and (3) of
the name or likeness of another. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563-64 (Utah 1988);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977). Ms. Stien concedes that neither her name
nor her likeness was shown in the videotape. In fact, in her brief she candidly admits that
her argument is "complicated by the fact that she is not mentioned by name in the video
nor is she shown." [Appellant Br. at 12]. Even assuming that Ms. Stien could somehow
show an "appropriation" of her name or likeness, her argument must fail because any
such "appropriation" would have been merely incidental, and Ms. Stien cannot establish
that there was any intrinsic value to the use of her name or likeness, or that Defendants
obtained any benefit from such use. See Cox, 761 P.2d at 564-65.
In Cox, the Utah Supreme Court examined plaintiffs' claims for
defamation, invasion of privacy, and abuse of personal identity. Id at 557. The case
stemmed from a photograph taken of the plaintiffs with Senator Hatch, which was used as
part of a political advertisement. The trial court dismissed the claims and the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs could not state a claim based upon
appropriation of name or likeness under section 652C of Restatement of Torts, or under

242\138044.1
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Utah's abuse of personal identity statute. Id. at 564 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-3-3
(1993)).2
In Cox, unlike the instant case, the plaintiffs actually appeared in the
allegedly offensive publication, and, in addition, the publication was used in a political
advertisement. The court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs failed to show that their
names or likenesses had any intrinsic value that the defendants appropriated. The court
explained that intrinsic value cannot be established "just because the defendants may
have obtained some benefit by using the plaintiffs' likenesses when the benefit is the
same as defendants would have had from using the likeness of a number of other
[individuals]." Id at 564.
In this case, Ms. Stien claims that the videotape was shown at an event
that had a commercial purpose. Even if a company Christmas party can have such a
purpose, such an assertion is insufficient to satisfy the elements of Ms. Stien's privacy
claim. Any imputation of Ms. Stien's name or likeness in the videotape, because she was
not named or shown, was merely incidental. Any benefit obtained by Defendants would
have been "the same as defendants would have had from using [the name or] the
likeness" of anyone other than Ms. Stien. As in Cox, in this case the videotape was not
used to appropriate any value that Ms. Stien's name or likeness may have had. The
videotape was intended as a joke, and that joke would have its intended effect regardless

Ms. Stien has not raised a statutory claim, presumably because the Utah statute requires that the
prohibited use must involve an advertisement in which there is an implication that the claimant endorses or
approves of the advertised subject matter. Under Utah's former statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-4-8 (1953),
an action could lie for use of a person's name, portrait or picture "for advertising purposes or for purposes
of trade." That broader purpose was consistent with the historic development of a statutory cause of action
for invasion of privacy. See generally, W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §117,
at 850-54 (5th ed. 1984).
242\138044.1
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of who was featured which is, in fact, what happened with the other people displayed in
the videotape.
Where the use of a person's name or likeness is merely incidental, there
can be no recovery for appropriation of name or likeness. "The incidental use of a
person's name or likeness is not, as a matter of law, actionable as an appropriation of a
person's name or likeness under the Restatement or the Utah statute." Cox, 761 P.2d at
565. The Court in Cox relied on a Massachusetts case, Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly
Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (1980), wherein the court distinguished
between situations in which the defendant makes an incidental use of the
plaintiffs name, portrait or picture and those in which the defendant uses the
plaintiffs name, portrait or picture deliberately to exploit its value for advertising
or trade purposes.
Id. at 850. Ms. Stien has failed to present any evidence that Defendants deliberately
exploited her name or likeness for advertising or trade purposes.
Unlike Cox, the videotape at issue in this case did not identify Ms. Stien,
either by name or by likeness. There was at most an indirect reference to her as the
partner of an unnamed individual who appeared on the videotape (an individual who has
chosen not to pursue a claim in this case)/ The only way a viewer could identify Ms.

Throughout Ms. Stien's brief, she refers to the employer/employee relationship and argues that this
Court should not permit employers to treat kiempioyee[s] as a chattel whose legal and moral duty includes
entertaining the employer." [Appellant's Br. at 6-7]. It is undisputed, however, that there is no
employment relationship between Ms. Stien and any of the Defendants. Moreover, although there was an
employment relationship between Mr. Bauman and Marriott, Mr. Bauman has chosen not to pursue any
claims against Defendants, presumably because he does not have any faith in their merit. In any event, Ms.
Stien's arguments about employer/employee relationships have no bearing on this case and this Court
should disregard them.
242\138044 1
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Stien is if the viewer knew Mr. Bauman by sight, and had independent knowledge that
Ms. Stien was his wife.
A similarly attenuated relationship was held to be insufficient to sustain a
claim for relief in Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N. Y. 1944),
which involved the film Yankee Doodle Dandy, a fictionalized account of the life of
George M. Cohan. Mr. Cohan's first wife brought a lawsuit claiming damages for
invasion of privacy. The suit was brought pursuant to the New York state statute which
provided that damages could be recovered for injury from the use of a person's name,
portrait, or picture for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade in the absence of
consent. Id. at 40.4 The actress playing Mrs. Cohan in the film bore no resemblance to
the plaintiff and had a different first name; furthermore, there was no mention in the film
of the fact that Cohan had had more than one wife. The court in Levey dismissed the
complaint, holding that "the motion picture does not sufficiently portray or picture the
plaintiff to justify the conclusion that the defendant violated any right of privacy afforded
her by the Civil Right Law." Id. at 42. Similarly, in this case there is no basis for
concluding that Ms. Stien's name or likeness was appropriated by Defendants for their
use or benefit, and the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Stien's claim.

Although these claims were based on a state statute, the elements of this statutory claim are similar to the
elements of a common law claim for appropriation of name or likeness, as alleged by Ms. Stien in this
case.
242\138044 1
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B.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSE PRIVATE
FACTS ABOUT MS. STIEN.

Section 652D of the Restatement recognizes a cause of action for
"publicity given to private life." See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). To
state a claim under this branch of invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show that (1)
publicity was given, (2) to a private affair; (3) which would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. Id. This section of the Restatement provides "tort liability . . . for
publicity given to true statements of fact." Id at 383 (emphasis added). The purpose of
the section is to allow recovery where some personal piece of true information, which is
not of legitimate concern to the public (such as a photo "of a pair in a hotel room in a
state of dishabbile"), is published or made public. Id. at 386-87. Nothing in this section
of the Restatement suggests that recovery is proper where the publicized information is
not true.
Ms. Stien's claim for public disclosure of private facts cannot succeed
because there was no disclosure of any information regarding Ms. Stien's private affairs.
Her husband responded to a question regarding a household chore. [Appellant' Br. at 4].
He was not speaking about his sex life with Ms. Stien, therefore to the extent his
statements on the video suggest that he disliked having sex with his wife, those
statements were not true and were not intended to be taken as true by viewers of the
video. In other words, the videotape did not convey actual facts. See Order Granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3 (Addendum A).
Although Ms. Stien admits that the publicized statements were not a true
description of her husband's feelings about having sex with her, and although she
acknowledges that distasteful household chores are not private affairs, she nevertheless
seeks recovery for disclosure of private facts. Ms. Stien acknowledges there are no Utah
242\138044 1
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cases discussing this branch of invasion of privacy and therefore relies upon the
Restatement. Her application of section 652D, however, is erroneous. This section
plainly states that it is intended to provide relief when true facts are published and those
facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Ms. Stien cannot meet this
standard.
Ms. Stien also cannot meet her burden of establishing that the disclosures
made on the tape were highly offensive to a reasonable person. The trial court viewed the
videotape and found they were not as a matter of law. The trial court, after viewing the
videotape, found that no reasonable person could possibly view the videotape as anything
other than a joke or conclude that the video contained factual statements about Ms.
Stien's private affairs. The court stated, "[t]he videotape is not reasonably capable of
conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo described by [Ms. Stien] as the basis
for her invasion of privacy claim." Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, at 3 (Addendum A). The trial court properly dismissed Ms. Stien's claim for
disclosure of private facts, and this Court should affirm that ruling.
C.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT PLACE MS. STIEN IN A FALSE
LIGHT.

To state a claim for false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant (1) gave publicity to a matter concerning the plaintiff, (2) that places
the plaintiff before the public in a false light, (3) the false light in which the plaintiff was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) the defendant knew that
the plaintiff would be placed in a false light, or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff was placed. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
242\ 138044 1
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The trial court viewed the videotape at the hearing on the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and determined that it could not rationally be considered
to convey actual facts about the participants' sex lives or those of their unnamed partners.
[R. 333]. The court explained:
There was no serious connotation regarding any of the participants' actual
sexual conduct.... No reasonable person could possibly view the
videotape as anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude that the tape
was a factual statement about plaintiffs private life.
[R. 333]. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment on Ms. Stien's claim
for false light invasion of privacy. [R. at 333-34].
The trial court correctly concluded that the videotape did not place Ms.
Stien in a false light on the basis that no reasonable viewer would treat the videotape as a
serious commentary on her sex life, or any other private matters. While the tort of false
light invasion of privacy generally protects individuals from falsehoods made public, if a
statement cannot reasonably be taken as fact, as with the edited statements in the
videotape about sex with "partners," the statement does not amount to false light invasion
of privacy because the public does not receive a false impression of that individual. In
other words, "there is no cause of action for false light invasion of privacy if the
statement obviously purports to be fictitious." Restatement (Second) of Torts §652E,
cmt. a (1981 Appendix) (citing Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
In Walko v. Kean College of New Jersey, 561 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super.
1988), a college administrator sued the college for false light invasion of privacy arising
from a spoof edition of the school newspaper identifying the plaintiff as a person
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available for "good telephone sex." The court extended the holding in Hustler Magazine
v. FalwelK 486 U.S. 496 (1988), that one cannot recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for publication of a caricature without showing a false statement of
fact, to the plaintiffs action for false light invasion of privacy. The court determined that
the parody did not contain a false statement of fact because no reasonable reader would
interpret the parody as a serious portrayal of actual facts and granted summary judgment
in defendant's favor. Walko, 561 A.2d at 687-88; see also Salek v. Passaic Collegiate
School, 605 A.2d 276, 279 (N.J. Super. 1992) (with false light invasion tort, judge must
decide legal question of "whether the criticized matter is capable of the meaning assigned
to it by plaintiff); Fudge v. Penthouse International, Ltd.. 840 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (1st
Cir.) (photograph of young girls obtained from Associated Press and reprinted in news
section of pornography magazine did not place subjects in false light; photograph not
reasonably capable of implying endorsement as a matter of law), cert, denied, 488 U.S.
821 (1988); Pring v. Penthouse International. Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 441-442 (10th Cir.
1982) (sexual parody that could not be taken literally by reasonable reader and therefore
did not cast plaintiff in false light), cert, denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
Ms. Stien does not challenge on appeal the trial court's conclusion that no
reasonable viewer would consider the videotape a serious account of her sex life. Her
main complaint with the trial court's ruling is that the caselaw cited by the defendants
deals with "press related cases with public figures"5 and is therefore inapposite.
5

Ms. Stien's contention that she is not a public figure is curious in light of contradictory allegations in her
Complaint:
Plaintiff Cassedy Stien is a two-time world champion skier that [sic] has professionally endorsed
products for competition and which [sic] has a professional image and reputation recognized by
those within the ski industry generally and Park City, Utah specifically.
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[Appellant's Br. at 15]. Actually, Salek v. Passaic Collegiate School Fudge v. Penthouse
International Ltd., and Pring v. Penthouse International Ltd., all deal with private
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court in Pring rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
inquiry of whether the offending material "could be reasonably understood as describing
actual facts about the plaintiff should only apply to public figures. Pring, 695 F.2d at
442. Regardless of whether Ms. Stien is a public or private figure, the dispositive
inquiry, and the conclusion that the videotape cannot credibly be termed a serious
commentary on Ms. Stien's sex life, remain the same.
Ms. Stien's only other fault with the trial court's ruling is her belief that it
"amounts to saying as long as employees make the employers laugh, employees have no
protected privacy right."6 [Appellant's Br. at 15]. The trial court did not rule, and the
defendants have never suggested, that the test for a false light invasion of privacy claim is
whether the criticized matter is funny.7 Rather, a cause of action arises if the criticized
matter publicizes false facts in such a manner that they appear true to the reasonable
viewer. That is not the case here as was found by the trial court.
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the videotape does not
violate Ms. Stien's privacy by placing her in a false light. The reasonable viewer would

[R. 4]. Ms. Stien confirmed her public status through responses to written discovery by producing her
resume, stating that she had appeared in skiing films, and providing newspaper articles discussing her
skiing achievements. [R.185].
6
Ms. Stien cites Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657 (Or. App. 1981), in which the Oregon Court of
Appeals determined that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to reach a jury on her cause of action
for outrageous conduct, arising from a "strip search" while she was employed at K-Mart. The plaintiff did
not allege that the strip search placed her in a false light, nor did she maintain that the strip search
otherwise violated her privacy rights, so it is difficult to guess what relevance Bodewig has to this appeal.
Again, it is undisputed that Ms. Stien was not an employee of any of the Defendants and it is therefore
difficult to understand her continued reliance on an employment relationship as a basis for a right of
privacy.
242\ 138044 1
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recognize the videotape as a spoof instead of a truthful and serious factual commentary
on Ms. Stien's private affairs.

D.

DEFENDANTS DID NOT INTRUDE UPON MS. STIEN'S
SECLUSION.

While the authorities on the issue of intrusion upon seclusion are scarce,
those authorities are in total harmony as to two elements which must be clearly shown.
In order to sustain the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, Ms. Stien must show: (1) that
there was an intentional, substantial, and actual intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon
her seclusion; and (2) that such intrusion would be highly offensive to the reasonable
person. See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). Ms. Stien's argument fails on both counts.
In the first instance, the videotape in question did not and could not rise to
the level of an actual and substantial intrusion into or upon the life of Ms. Stien. The
cases which have focused upon the issue of the nature of the intrusion itself have
concluded that something far more tangible than the oblique reference in the videotape
must have occurred in order for an intrusion to be found. For example, in Haehn v. City
of Hoisington, 702 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Kan. 1988), the court ruled that sexual comments
and brief touching did not amount to a claim of invasion of privacy. Specifically, in
discussing the intrusion upon seclusion tort as found in Section 652B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the court stated:
Intrusion upon Seclusion have focused on two factors: whether
there has been an intentional interference in the solitude or
seclusion of a person's physical being, or a prying into his or her

242\138044.1

16

private affairs or concerns, and whether the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Id. atl531.
The court analyzed the issue of what kinds of acts are considered to be
intrusive enough to merit application of the tort. In this analysis, the court, by
illustration, noted the kinds of intrusion to which the tort is fashioned:
Several cases are illustrative: installation of an electronic listening
device in a tenant's bedroom, [citation omitted]; taking pictures
and peeking through windows with binoculars, [citation omitted];
unauthorized prying into the plaintiffs bank account, [citation
omitted].
Id. at 1531.
The alleged intrusion in this case did not involve Ms. Stien at all. She was
not named nor was any act or anecdote relating to her private life ever described. In
short, there was never, to any reasonable mind, an intrusion of any kind.
The second part of the analysis is that the intrusion must be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person." Again, it was readily apparent to the trial court, and
would be readily apparent to anyone else looking at the video, that it was intended to be a
joke. There was no intent to intrude upon anyone's private life. There was no description
of any particular act or aspect of Ms. Stien's private life. The video could be considered
nothing more than an attempt at humor. The trial court was correct in concluding that
this attempt at humor did not rise to the level of being highly offensive in the same way
that an actual intrusion upon one's private affairs would be highly offensive.
This Court, in Turner, recognized that the intrusion complained of must be
outrageous or shocking in order to meet the standard of "highly offensive." In
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commenting, in that case, upon the supposed intrusion, the Court noted that there was no
evidence that the complainant was harassed or annoyed in the course of the supposed
investigation which the complainant claimed to be intrusive. Turner, 832 P.2d at 67 n.8.
The acts complained of in this case are neither intrusive nor highly
offensive. No other conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. The trial court viewed
the only evidence on that issue and correctly ruled that the privacy of Ms. Stien was not
breached. That ruling should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Ms. Stien's
invasion of privacy claims. The subject matter of the videotape did not involve private or
sensitive information. The individuals were describing household chores. While the
videotape was dubbed to make it appear that the individuals were discussing their sex
life, it was clear to all viewers that the sex lives were not being discussed and that the
videotape was a spoof or joke.
Neither Ms. Stien's likeness nor her name were appropriated. She is not
shown on the video and her name is never mentioned. In fact, while her husband was
shown on the video, even he was not identified by name. Any possible indirect reference
to Ms. Stien was merely incidental. The videotape was an attempt at humor and
entertainment and it was not made for the purpose of financial exploitation. Under these
circumstances, there is no invasion of privacy. Defendants respectfully ask this Court to
affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
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DATED this

\\V* day of February, 1997.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY

Attorneys for Marriott Ownership
Resorts, Inc.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By:JA

L O/^

E. Tibbitts
flianne R. Blanch
Attorneys for Shari Levitin

l^Jr^A^^i
Attorney for Peter Gatch

JAsepa T// Huggins
attorney for Tom Messina
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

B

CameroivS. Dennings
Attorneys for Brent Ferrin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, thisTfaday of
February, 1997, to the following:
Gregory J. Sanders
Sandra L. Steinvoort
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM
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No._

FIIEO
CiefKOt Summit County

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
8
Bryon J. Benevento (5254)
VMatthew M. Durham (6214)
Attorneys for Defendant
Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

&
Deputy Cleft

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRAD BAUMAN and CASSEDY
STIEN,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 950300087 PI

MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP RESORTS,
INC., SHARI LEVITIN, TOM
MESSINA, BRENT FERRIN and
PETER GATCH,
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before
this Court for oral argument on Monday, July 22, 1996.
Honorable Pat B. Brian presided.
Gregory J. Sanders.

The

Plaintiff was represented by

Defendant Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.

was represented by Bryon J. Benevento.
was represented by Ryan E. Tibbitts.
was represented by Duane R. Smith.

Defendant Shari Levitin
Defendant Brent Ferrin

Defendant Peter Gatch was

QTJWM »T DA£C n •"> r\

represented by Janet A. Goldstein.

Defendant Tom Messina was

represented by Joseph J. Huggins.
The Court marked and received into evidence the
videotape in question.

Based upon the review of the videotape,

the supporting and opposing memoranda, oral argument of
counsel, and for other good cause appearing thereon;
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, for purposes of this motion,
as follows:
1.

The videotape in question was shown at a

Christmas party for entertainment purposes.

There were

approximately 200 people present at the party, including Brad
Bauman and Cassedy Stien.
2.

The videotape is approximately six (6) minutes

in length and contains brief excerpts of approximately fifteen
individuals, including Brad Bauman.

The individuals on the

videotape were asked to describe a distasteful household chore.
The audio was then changed to make it appear uhat the
individuals were answering a question of what sex was like with
their partners.
3.

Due to the nature of the original question, none

of the individuals actually described their sexual activities
or any other private information.
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4.

The videotape was not used to promote or sponsor

Marriott Ownership Resorts, nor was it instructional in nature.
5.

The videotape did not name Brad Bauman or

Cassedy Stien, nor did it identify them by job position, job
title or employment task.
6.

The videotape did not purport to inform the

viewer of the participants' actual sexual experiences with
their partners.

There was no serious connotation regarding any

of the participants' actual sexual conduct.

Instead, the

videotape was nothing more than an effort at humor.
ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT CONCLUDES as follows:
1.

No reasonable person could possibly view the

videotape as anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude
that the tape was a factual statement about plaintiff's private
life.
2.

While the videotape may have been in poor taste,

it did not invade plaintiff's privacy rights.
3.

The videotape is not reasonably capable of

conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo described by
plaintiff as the basis for her invasion of privacy claim.
4.

The videotape did not convey actual facts, it

constituted mere opinion in the form of a joke or spoof, and
thus may not predicate a claim for false light or invasion of privacy.
196X110221 1

3

5.

There are no genuine disputes as to any material

facts on these issues, and defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law on all claims for relief plead by
plaintiff.
THEREFORE, this Court grants defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment against plaintiff.
DATED t h i s . ^ X ^

day of August, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

<7^& /

Honorable Pau~-D.
?= DrijSn
District Court Jud<
Approved as to form:
KIPP Sc CHRISTIAN

\date
Gregory tSandej?s
-for plaintij
Attorney -for"
plaintiff s

C ^V^
.M^1'4'

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

r
RVari El T*ibbits

!

Y/^/^Xdate / U (<T ^ j .
<^

\

Attbrn&y for defendant Shari Levitin

\date % H p P
Janet A. Goldstein
Attorney for defendant Peter Gatch
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DART,/ADAMS®N & D

,,,,,,,_.
date
. Smith ' /
Dua:
Attorney for/defendant Brent Ferrin
/
/

^
\date
Joseph/ JZ Hug^itts
Attorney BOOT defendant Tom Messina
/
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AFFTDAVTT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Cheryl Hunter, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law offices of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Shari Levitin, herein; that she served
the attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (Case Number 950300087PI, Third District Court, Summit County) upon the
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Byron J. Benevento
Matthew M. Durham
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Gregory J. Sanders
Sandra 1. Steinvoort
Kipp & Christian
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Duane R. Smith
Cameron S. Denning
Dart Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph J. Huggins
243 East 400 South
Metro Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Janet A. Goldstein
Deer Valley Plaza
P. O. Box 4556
Park City, Utah 84060
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage pr
1996.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of August,

day of August, 1996.

A^/t"^
NOTARY PUBLIC
Suzanne H. Hurst
10 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
My Commission Expires
April 7. 1998

STATE OF UTAH

PUBLIC
Residir 'in the State of Utah

